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1. INTRODUCTION
Consider an economy which is known to have more than one competitive equilibrium. The
agents in such an economy face uncertainty about which of the possible equilibria will occur. This
type of uncertainty is called endogenous uncertainty (Kurz, 1974), to distinguish it from the normal
concept of exogenous uncertainty which can appear in the economy's specification of preferences,
technologies, and/or endowments.
This paper makes two related points about endogenous uncertainty. First, given standard
concavity assumptions, agents having common priors about the endogenous uncertainty have cause to
make contingent trades before the equilibrium is realized. Second, we identify certain trading
processes that inevitably reduce and ultimately eliminate the endogenous uncertainty. This suggests
that while there is nothing inherently illogical about an economy which admits multiple equilibria,
common priors about the equilibrium to be selected generate gains from trade which may eventually
remove the multiplicity.
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. Consider an economic system in which
there is uncertainty about which of several possible equilibria will be chosen. The ex-ante utility of
risk averse agents is reduced by this uncertainty. Further, this uncertainty is endogenous: it is not
forced on the system by the randomness of nature, but arises only because agents are unsure which
equilibrium will be chosen by the system. It is therefore possible for the agents to make deals
amongst themselves which reduces this uncertainty. If agent A is well-off at equilibrium a and badly-
off at equilibrium b, while agent B is well-off at equilibrium b but badly-off at equilibrium a, then
each can partially insure the other against his adverse equilibrium. Such mutual insurance deals can
ultimately remove all of the endogenous uncertainty, ensuring a unique allocation of resources in the
system which obtains whatever the equilibrium selected.
Broadly speaking, our result suggests that any market structure which generates endogenous
uncertainty carries within it "the seeds of its own destruction," i.e., incentives for agents to make
changes in that market structure. Uniqueness of equilibrium may thus arise not as a result of the
underlying tastes and technology in an economy, but rather as the result of endogenous changes to the
market structure.
We prove this result with comparatively little structure upon the way that the agents realize
gains from trade. In particular, we do not assume that these new trades can be accomplished without
introducing still more endogenous uncertainty. Thus we subsume the price-contingent securities which
are developed in Chichilnisky, Dutta, and Heal (1991) and Hahn (1991) and the endogenous
uncertainty about default which arises in Chichilnisky and Wu (1992). In spite of the fact that our
analysis is more general than these other papers, our arguments are more transparent, cutting through
the layers of endogenous uncertainty that can be generated as agents make contingent trades in the
face of endogenous uncertainty.
Implications of the analysis for bargaining theory are explored in the example of Section 3.2.
2. GENERAL RESULTS
2.1. Weak Efficiency
Let X be the set of feasible allocations, and let x denote a generic element of this set. We
assume that X is a convex and compact subset of some topological vector space. Let there be n
individuals, and let U = (U^U2,...!!11) list their utility functions. We assume that each U1: X -> R is
continuous and concave.
Our theorem considers a sequence of probability measures {mt}7-i on X. This sequence is
interpreted as a trading process in the pure-exchange economies of Section 3.1, where nit reflects
"expectations" about the allocations which would result were the process to end in period t. The
sequence reflects uncertainty about a negotiation process in the bargaining problems of Section 3.2.
At stage t of the process, mt gives the distribution over allocations We assume that the utility which
individual i receives from probability measure mt is u[ s J Ul dmt (implicitly, we assume that each n^
is defined over a a-algebra which contains the Borel subsets of X, and thus the continuity of each U1
implies its measurability with respect to each mj. Because each utility function U1 is thus employed
as a von Neumann-Morgenstem index, the assumed concavity of U' implies that agent i is either risk-
neutral or risk-averse.
An allocation x e X is individually rational given mt.! if U(x) > u^ s J U dm^. An allocation
x € X is weakly efficient if there is no alternative allocation x' e X such that U(x') » U(x). A
utility vector u e conv U(X) is weakly efficient if there is no alternative utility vector u' e conv U(X)
such that u' » u (conv U(X) denotes the convex hull of U(X)).
Theorem 1: Let {mt}7-i be such that the support of each mt consists of weakly efficient alloca-





Figure 1: The "distance" between expected utility v^ and the efficient frontier declines exponentially
with t. (See the intuition and proof following Theorem 1.)
Intuition: See Figure 1, ignoring the functions P and Q (these functions are used by the
proof). For any t, consider the area (under the standard Lebesgue measure) of the set consisting of
those utility vectors in conv U(X) which dominate u,. This area provides a measure of the "distance"
between x^ and the efficient frontier. This distance is reduced when agents trade away n^ for mt+1.
Specifically, the individual rationality and efficiency of each allocation x in the support of mt+1 imply
that U(x) lies in the half-moon-shaped region above the diagonal line, and consequently, the new
expected utility u^ must also lie in this region. This observation implies that the area of the set of
utility vectors which dominate u^, is no greater than one-half the area of the set of utility vectors
which dominated i^ . Thus the distance between expected utility and the efficient frontier declines
exponentially with L When Figure 1 is redrawn for n rather than 2 individuals, each iteration reduces
the distance between expected utility and the efficient frontier by a factor of (n!-l)/n! rather than 1/2.
Proof: Note that each i^  is in conv U(X) (i.e., the convex hull of U(X)), which is compact by
the compactness of X and the continuity of U. Also note that each u^ > Ut by individual rationality.
These two observations immediately imply that lim^iit exists. Efficiency remains to be proven.
Define P: conv U(X) -» Rn by
(Vi) P*(u) = max (v11 v € conv U(X) and v > u}.
Since P(u) > u, we may usefully consider u([u,P(u)]), which is the volume of the box [u,P(u)] whose
opposing vertices are u and P(u). Since P is continuous (by the Maximum Theorem as stated in
Debreu (1959), p. 19), and since u([ut,P(ut)]) declines exponentially (by Lemma 4 (Appendix)),
u(
= 0.
By Lemma 2 (Appendix), this is equivalent to the weak efficiency of li
2.2. Strong Efficiency
U is strictly concave if
(VA. € (0,l))(VxV e X) x° * x1 => U((l-X)x°+Xx1) » (l-X)U(x°) + \U(xl).
Strict concavity is reasonable when there are two persons dividing a fixed allocation of resources. Yet
it is difficult to defend when there are three or more individuals. For example, imagine that three
(selfish) persons are dividing a pie and that x and x' are two distinct allocations that give person 1 the
same share. There is no reason to expect that person 1 will strictly prefer a convex combination of x
and x' over either x alone or x' alone. As a reasonable alternative to strict concavity when n > 3, we
say that U is semi-strictly concave if
(VX, e (O.DXVxV e X) x° * x1 => Utfl-W+Xx1) > (l-X)U(x°) + UJ(xl),
where the vector inequality > denotes a strict inequality in one coordinate and weak inequalities in all
other coordinates. Because each U1 serves as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index, these two
varieties of strict concavity imply that some or all of the persons are risk averse.
An allocation x e X is strongly efficient if there is no alternative allocation x ' e X such that
U(x') > U(x). A utility vector u e conv U(X) is strongly efficient if there exists no alternative u' e
conv U(X) such that iT > u.
Theorem 2 assumes the equivalence of strong and weak efficiency. This equivalence follows
from monotonicity by standard arguments made within any Walrasian model (Section 3.1). It also
follows from strict concavity (Lemma 5 (Appendix)).
Theorem 2: As in Theorem 1, let {mt)7-i be such that the support of each mt consists of
weakly efficient allocations which are individually rational given m^. In addition, assume that U is
semi-strictly concave and that any utility vector u e conv U(X) is strongly efficient iff it is weakly
efficient Then limt_^.ut is strongly efficient and there exists a unique x* e X such that U(x*) =
limt_Hjut.
Proof: Strong Efficiency. By Theorem 1 and the assumed equivalence of strong and weak
efficiency, limt_>Mut is strongly efficient.
Existence. Since limt_M.ut e conv U(X) by Theorem 1, Carathe'odory's Theorem (Rockafellar
(1970), p. 155) implies the existence of n+1 allocations {XjJJo and n+1 nonnegative scalars {A j^l^  such
that Sjl^ Xj = 1 and Zj^UCxj) = liml_H.ut. If any two of the allocations receiving positive weight are
distinct, semi-strict concavity implies that U(5^0X.jxj) > Zj^UCXj) = limt_H.ut, which contradicts the
strong efficiency of limt_+_ut. Thus the allocations receiving positive weight are identical and we may
set x* equal to any of them.
Uniqueness. If x * x' and U(x) = U(x') = limt_>-ut, semi-strict concavity implies that
U((x+x')/2) > (U(x)+U(x'))/2 = limt_>-ut, which contradicts the strong efficiency of limt_»-iit. I
One might conjecture that the strong efficiency of limt_H.ul could also be obtained without the
assumed equivalence of weak and strong efficiency if one assumed instead that every allocation in the
support of every mt is strongly (rather than weakly) efficient. This reasonable conjecture is proven
false by the following example.
Example: Before constructing the pertinent three-person example, we develop a simpler two-
person example. Consider Figure 2a, noting that U(X) is the heavy curve constituting the northeast
edge of the figure [this could be constructed by defining X = { (x\x2) e R2 I x*+x2 = 2 } and by
defining U by Ul(x) = (x*)1/2 and U2(x) = min { (x2)1/2, 1 } ]. Define n^ to be the probability measure
whose support consists of two allocations yielding the utility vectors vt and W! and whose expected
utility is uv Given ulf define v2 and w2 as in Figure 2a. Then define m2 to be the probability measure
whose two-element support consists of the two utility vectors v2 and w2 and whose expected utility is
ii2. Repeat this process indefinitely to define {mt)7-3- The sequence {mt}7-i satisfies the assumptions
of Theorem 1, and as Theorem 1 requires, liml_M.ut exists and is weakly (but not strongly) efficient
Now consider Figure 2b, which is a top view of the three-dimensional object constructed by
pivoting Figure 2a on its vertical axis through a 90-degree angle. This provides a top view of U(X) in
the pertinent three-person example [it can be constructed by defining X = [ (x^.x^.x2) e Rj I x ^ x ^ x 3
= 2 }, and by defining U by (Vi=la,lb) UXx) = (x')1/2 and U2(x) = min { (x2)iy2, 1 }.]
Imbed Figure 2a into Figure 2b by aligning the horizontal axis { u I u2 = 0 and u1 > 0 } in
Figure 2a with the diagonal {u I u2 = 0 and u1* = ulb > 0} in Figure 2b. Note that Vj can be expressed
as a mixture of the strongly efficient utility vectors vu and vlb. Define m, to be the probability
measure whose support consists of three allocations yielding the utility vectors vu , vlb, and wlt and
whose expected utility is u}. Then for t = 2, express v2 as a mixture of two strongly efficient utility
vectors v^ and v2b, and define m2 to be the probability measure whose three-element support yields the
utility vectors v^, v2b, and w2 and whose expected utility is u2. Repeat this process indefinitely to
obtain {mt}7-3-
The sequence {mt)7-i satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1, and as Theorem 1 requires,
limt__ut exists and is weakly efficient. However, it is not strongly efficient in spite of the fact that the
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Figure 2: The heavy line in Figure 2a illustrates the utility frontier for a two person example. Figure
2b provides a top view of the utility frontier obtained from 2a by pivoting 2a on its vertical axis to
obtain a three person example. Each u, is obtained as a mixture of strongly efficient aUocatioas.
Nonetheless, each u, lies below the utility frontier, and limt_^ut is only weakly efficient
83. APPLICATIONS
3.1. Pure-Exchange Economies
Consider a pure-exchange economy in which the aggregate endowment of the k goods is oo e
Rj and the utility function of each of the n individuals is Ul: R* -» R. Assume that each U1 is strictly
monotonic in each coordinate, strictly concave, and continuous. Let X = {x = [x1 x2 ... x"] e R*n I
X^x' = ©} be the set of all feasible consumption allocations (i.e., the Edgeworth box). By standard
arguments (e.g., Varian (1984), p. 198), the assumed continuity and monotonicity are sufficient to
imply the equivalence of strong and weak efficiency. Furthermore, the assumed strict concavity of
each U* implies that U = (U\U2,...Un) is semi-strictly concave (also note that the strict concavity of U1
is equivalent to i's risk aversion).
Let W: X —> X denote the Walrasian equilibrium correspondence (i.e., for any endowment
allocation x e X, let W(x) denote the collection of all equilibrium allocations). Further suppose that
for any endowment x in X, all n persons agree on a probability measure over the equilibrium
allocations W(x). Call this probability measure M(x). Let XQ be an exogenously given endowment,
and let n^ = M(xo) be the probability measure which the persons assign to equilibrium allocations in
W(Xo).
We now define a straightforward trading process {mt}7«2 such that {mt}7«i satisfies our
assumptions of efficiency and individual rationality. We construct this example recursively: for all t >
2 we define mt = M(E[mt.j]). In other words, we let each mt be the commonly held probability
measure assigned to the equilibrium allocations that result from an endowment equal to the expectation
of m^. At each t, every allocation in the support of mt is efficient (since it is an equilibrium
allocation) and individually rational (since its utility vector is bounded from below by UG^m^]),
which is in turn bounded from below by ux because of the concavity of U). Therefore, because of the
semi-strict concavity of U and the equivalence of strong and weak efficiency (see the first paragraph
of this section), Theorem 2 implies that liml_H-ut is strongly efficient and that there exists a unique
allocation x* such that limt_H.ut = U(x*). Thus the trading process {mt}7-2 eliminates all endogenous
uncertainty.
The trading process {mt}7-2 defined in the previous paragraph is a rather arbitrary example of a
trading process that utilizes efficient allocations and is individually rational at each stage. Many other
trading processes, such as those considered by Chichilnisky, Dutta, and Heal (1991) and Hahn (1991),
also satisfy these basic assumptions. These other trading processes can be quite realistic in that the
gains from trade against endogenous uncertainty can be realized through contingent securities which
have counterparts in actual financial markets. They can also be quite complicated in that the number
of markets (and hence the "dimension" of endogenous uncertainty) can explode geometrically as the
trading process evolves. It remains to be debated which of these many trading processes is the best
descriptive tool. Our contribution is to note that endogenous uncertainty is eliminated by any trading
process that satisfies the assumptions of efficiency and individual rationality.
It must be recognized that our assumption of individual rationality is strong. For example,
Chichilnisky, Dutta, and Heal (1991) construct a trading process in which the securities market at any
stage assumes that the individuals are endowed with the equilibrium consumption allocation obtained
at the previous stage. This endowment structure implies individual rationality. More generally,
however, it seems that markets might develop in ways that need not satisfy individual rationality. For
example, consider a k-good market whose endogenous uncertainty gives rise to a price-contingent
security. It is not immediately clear that everyone must be better off in the new market where k+1
prices are determined simultaneously. Modelling and understanding such markets strikes us as a
fundamental direction for future research.
3.2. Bargaining Problems
Consider a bargaining problem in which the set of feasible alternatives is X and the utility
function of each of the n individuals is IF: X —> R. Assume that X is a compact and convex subset of
some topological vector space, that U = (U1,U2,...Un) is continuous and semi-strictly concave (Section
2.2), and that weak and strong efficiency are equivalent (Section 2.2). By allowing lotteries, the set of
feasible utility vectors is conv U(X).
Suppose that there is a random arbitrator who, given any threat point u e conv U(X), selects
an efficient allocation which is individually rational given u. Further suppose that the n persons agree
upon the probability measure M(u) which governs the random arbitrator's selection. Let UQ be an
exogenously given threat point, and define mt = M(uo).
We now define a simple negotiation process {mt}7«2 such that the support of each mt consists
of efficient allocations that are individually rational given 1^.,. We construct this example recursively:
at each t £ 2, we define mt = M^. , ) . In other words, we let each mt be the probability measure that
the arbitrator would use to select an efficient allocation which is individually rational given the threat
point u^. Thus the agents' negotiation process is governed at each stage by imagining what the
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arbitrator would do. By Theorem 2, liml_+-ut is efficient and there exists a unique x* such that
l i n w i t = U(x*).
Each stage of this negotiation process is easily interpreted. If the support of m^ consists of
more than one allocation, semi-strict concavity (i.e., risk aversion) implies that u^ is not efficient. In
other words, the endogenous uncertainty introduced by following the imaginary random arbitrator at
the previous stage leads to potential gains from risk sharing among the agents. Since m^ defines a
new bargaining problem whose threat point is u^, the agents can once again govern their negotiation
process by what the arbitrator would do: they agree (for the moment) to select an allocation according
to mt = M(Ut.!). Theorem 2 implies that this negotiation process of repeated imaginary arbitration
ultimately eliminates the endogenous uncertainty regardless of the endogenous uncertainty which might
be introduced by following the imaginary random arbitrator at each stage. The result is to settle upon
the strongly efficient allocation x*.
This example suggests that while there is nothing inherently illogical about a random
arbitrator, common knowledge about the arbitrator's probability measure generates incentives for risk
sharing that ultimately remove the endogenous uncertainty introduced by the arbitrator. The particular
negotiation process {mt}7-2 defined above is one example of how the agents might realize these gains.
Our results show that every such process eliminates endogenous uncertainty provided that it is efficient
and individually rational at each step.
Finally, our results show that actual arbitration rather than pre-arbitration settlement occurs
only when the agents disagree about the behavior of the arbitrator (given the model's other
assumptions). In particular, each agent must expect, relative to the expectations of the others, that the
arbitrator will tend to favor their cause. Although such inconsistent expectations are anathema to
theoretical economics (Aumann (1976)), they can be easily fostered by opposing lawyers in an actual
dispute. These ideas are developed further by Chichilnisky, Dalvi, and Heal (1992).
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APPENDIX
Lemma 1: (Vi) P*(u) = max (w' I w e U(X) and w > u}.
Proof: Take any i. Since U(X) c conv U(X), it is obvious that Pi(u) £ max ( w ' l w e U(X)
and w £ u}. To show the reverse inequality, let v e conv U(X) be such that v1 = Pi(u) and v > u. By
Carathe'odory's Theorem (Rockafellar (1970), p. 155), there exist n+1 allocations {Xj}]^  and n+1
nonnegative scalars {AjJjLo such that 2 ^ ^ = 1 and Zj^UCXj) = v. Set w = UCZj^x^). The convexity
of X implies that w e U(X), and the concavity of U implies that w = UCIJoXjXj) £ S^ AjUCXj) = v.
This and v £ u imply that max ( w ' l w e U(X) and w £ u} £ v1 = P^u). I
Remark: We conjecture but do not prove that the weak efficiency of u e conv U(X) implies
u e U(X). We only know that u € conv U(X) implies the existence of n+1 allocations {xj}^ such
that u is a convex combination of {UCXi)}^ (see Carathdodory's Theorem in Rockafellar (1970), p.
155). The number of allocations in such a convex combination is important only to the extent that it
is finite.
Lemma 2: u([u,P(u)]) = 0 iff u is weakly efficient.
Proof: <=. u([u,P(u)]) > 0 implies P(u) » u. By Lemma 1, this implies that for each i,
there exists an x{ e X such that Ul(Xi) > u1 and U(Xj) > u. The convexity of X implies that
e X, and the concavity of each Uh implies that Uh(If,1(l/n)xi) > Tfml(\/n)\^(x^ = (l/n){
£wehUh(xi) } > uh. Hence, u is not weakly efficient.
=>. If u is not weakly efficient, there exists v € U(X) such that v » u. Hence P(u) > v »
u, which implies u([u,P(u)]) > 0. |
Lemma 3: If n is a positive integer, and if a^,...^ and r are positive reals, then
H s. ; 4 ) = ^
Proof: The result holds at n = 1 since
1
 -- • - ' *-- = ra,
1
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Lemma 4: (Vt>l) p C t ^ . P ^ ) ] ) < (n!-l)/n!
Proof: Take any t Since iit+1 > i^  by individual rationality, and thus
(1)
Hence if = 0, the result holds. Otherwise, P(u,) » u, and we may define Q: Rn -> R by
Q(u) = q(u-Ut),
where (Vi) q1 = ( P'Cu -^uj )'1. In terms of the box [iit.PCiit)], Q is the linear functional which assigns a
value of 0 at the vertex Ut and assigns a value of 1 at each vertex of the form (u^P^u,)).
In this paragraph, we show that
(Vu^Ut) Q(u) < 1 => u is not weakly efficient. (2)
Assume Q(u) < 1. Since q * 0 is the gradient of the linear functional Q, there must be an a > 0 such
that Q(u+aq) = 1. Since u > Ut and q » 0, this implies that u+aq lies in the simplex defined by the
n vertices {(u"i,Pi(u)}f_1. Thus there exist nonnegative scalars (i.e., barycentric coordinates) {X f^^  such
that ZJ.A = 1 and
u+aq.= XJ., W u ^ u ) ) . (3)
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By Lemma 1, we have for each i the existence of an xt e X such that
u(20 > O m u ) ) (4)




The first inequality follows from the concavity of U, the second inequality follows from (4), the
equality follows from (3), and the final inequality follows from q » 0.
Equation (2) implies that every allocation x in the support of ml+1 satisfies Q(U(x)) > 1 by
virtue of the assumption that every such x is weakly efficient and individually rational. Hence, the
linearity of Q implies
Q(u»i) = Q(J U dmt+1) = J QoU d n v > 1. (5)
Finally, we obtain
< p ( { u e [Up
P(Ul)]) - p({ u € [UpPCiOl I Q(u) < 1})
! p([ulfP(u,)])
The inequality follows from (1) and (5), and the second equality follows from Lemma 3 (applied at x
= u-iip a = q, and r = 1). I
Lemma S: Given strict concavity, any vector u e conv U(X) is strongly efficient iff it is
weakly efficient.
Proof: Suppose u e conv U(X) is not strongly efficient. Then there exists u' e conv U(X)
such that u' > u. By Carathdodory's Theorem, there exists n+1 allocations {Xj}]^  and n+1
nonnegative scalars {A }^"^  such that S^Xj = 1 and Zj1a0XjU(xj) = u. Similarly, there are {x]}]^ and {XI
}jlo such that I ^ = 1 and ZJoXjUCx/) = u*. By the distinctness of u' and u, the set {{Xj}jU, {x/ ^




Thus u is not weakly efficient. The converse is obvious.
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